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Industry Valuation Driven Earnings Management 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates whether industry valuation impacts firms’ earnings 
management decisions. Existing accounting literature assumes that industry 
valuation has a constant impact on this decision. We argue that a higher industry 
valuation increases the perceived benefits of earnings management at a time when 
the negative consequences associated with accrual reversal and the probability of 
detection are believed to be lower. Using a sample of quarterly data of U.S. firms 
from 1985 to 2005, we find that the four-quarter lagged industry valuation has a 
positive relationship with industry aggregate (current) discretionary accruals. 
More specific, one standard deviation increase in the aggregate industry valuation 
is associated with a significant increase of 2.4 cents in quarterly earnings per 
share. Our results are robust after controlling for several factors, including bubble 
years, size, leverage and performance. 
 
Keywords: Industry valuation, Earnings management, Market to book ratio 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
The current earnings management literature has examined earnings 
management from either a transaction-specific or a firm-specific point of view. In 
their review of earnings management literature, Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
mention that firms manage their earnings when they are at the time to raise capital, 
such as initial public offerings (IPOs) or seasoned equity offers (SEOs), or when 
they need to meet analyst expectations or bonus plan targets related to executive 
compensation schemes. However, these studies disregard the fact that market 
conditions, like economic growth and industry valuation, are not constant over 
time. Focusing on the latter, we hypothesize that industry valuation will influence 
managers’ decision to engage in earnings management. This can provide an 
explanation why earnings management occurs more frequent in some periods than 
in others. Our study contributes to two streams of literature. 
First, we contribute to literature by providing evidence of industry effects on 
firms’ earnings management decisions. Firms in the same industry face similar 
market conditions and (growth) prospects. Prior studies provide evidence that 
these industry prospects affect firms’ financial decisions. Harford (2005) finds 
that merger waves occur in response to specific industry shocks that require large 
scale reallocation of assets. Mackay and Phillips (2005) find that industry and 
group factors are important to firms’ capital structure decisions. Given the 
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importance of such industry effects, we investigate the impact of industry 
valuation on earnings management and aim to provide more empirical evidence 
on how industry effects can affect firms’ decision making. 
Second, our study provides new evidence on the relationship between stock 
market valuation and earnings management. Prior studies examine the association 
between valuation and earnings management. Jensen (2004) argues that over-
valued firms have incentives to sustain their overvaluation. Kothari et al. (2006) 
empirically test Jensen (2004)’s argument and find evidence that the discretionary 
accruals of over-valued firms are much higher than firms with lower valuations. 
However, different from Kothari et al. (2006), we argue that the level of industry 
valuation can influence the earnings management decision of all firms in that 
industry, not only over valued ones. This is because the level of industry valuation 
can change the benefits and costs to manage earnings for all firms in that industry. 
Our study shows how different cycles of booms and bursts in any industry 
changes managers’ incentives to manage earnings. Rajgopal et al. (2007) focus on 
macro economic incentives that drive earnings management incentives, using 
macro economic variables (like GDP), that proxy for investor optimism in good 
times. Because economic cycles vary in time across industry, we argue that 
industry level provides a more accurate level of analysis to examine the impact of 
market conditions, i.e. the valuation levels of stocks on earnings management.  
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    In this study, we employ a large sample of U.S. firms taken from 
COMPUSTAT. The sample period covers 20 years from 1985 to 2005.  We test 
our hypothesis by examining the association between industry valuation and four-
quarter ahead aggregate current discretionary accruals of individual firms in the 
industry. Following the behavioral finance literature (Baker et al., 2004), we use 
market to book ratio to proxy for the level of valuation. First, we find that after 
including the usual explanatory factors for earnings management, such as 
leverage, size, and performance, our measure for industry aggregate earnings 
management of each quarter remains is significantly positively associated with the 
lagged industry market to book ratio. This result holds for both current 
discretionary accruals and total discretionary accruals. In economic terms, this 
implies that one standard deviation increase in the industry valuation is associated 
with a significant increase of 2.4 cents in quarterly earnings per share. Second, to 
exclude alternative explanations, we run several robustness analyses, such as 
excluding high tech firms and excluding observations during bubble years. We 
continue to find a significantly positive association between aggregate current 
discretionary accruals and the industry market-to-book ratio.  
    The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we discuss related literature 
and develop our hypotheses. In Section III we describe our data and construct 
variables. In Section IV we present our main results, and analyze their robustness. 
In Section V, we discuss our findings. 
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2. Previous Literature and Hypotheses Development 
Firms make earnings management decisions after balancing the benefits and the 
costs associated with this decision. The underlying economic rationale for 
earnings management is that benefits outweigh the costs. Inversely, earnings 
management motives decrease if costs outweigh the benefits. Before analyzing 
the effects of industry valuation on earnings management, we start with a 
discussion of the benefits and costs related to earnings management.  
 
Benefits of Earnings Management 
Since Ball and Brown (1968), numerous studies document a positive 
association between earnings surprises and stock returns. This offers managers the 
possibility to use earnings management in an attempt to influence stock price. 
Prior studies find evidence that support this argument. First, in their survey, 
Graham et al. (2005) report that CFOs’ main motivation to engage in earnings 
management is to influence the firm’s stock price. Second, managers’ personal 
wealth is closely linked with stock price because of equity based compensation 
and human capital (Murphy, 1999). Third, stock price will decline in reaction to 
firms missing their analyst forecasts (Skinner and Sloan, 2002).  
Although incentives to influence stock price by earnings management always 
exist, we argue that the extent to which stock prices react to earnings is positively 
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associated with the industry valuation. Veronesi (1999) investigates the effects of 
market fundamentals on investors’ response to firms’ earnings announcements. 
His analytical model demonstrates that investors will overreact to bad news when 
the market is performing well, but under react to good news when the stock 
market is performing poorly. This argument can also be applied to an industry 
level. It implies that there is more severe punishment of releasing disappointing 
earnings when the industry is expected to perform well than when it is expected to 
perform poorly. However the benefits of meeting earning expectations are higher 
in good times than in bad times. Therefore, earnings management has more appeal 
to managers when the industry valuation is higher.  This argument is consistent 
with Dyck and Zingales (2002, p.85) who argue that “during a downturn, the 
valuation of a stock depends more on its liquidation value than on its future 
growth, making it less sensitive to news.” In sum, we argue that the benefits of 
earnings management are higher when the industry has a higher valuation. 
Rational managers would time earnings management according to the level of the 
industry valuation.  
 
Costs of Earnings Management 
Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) argue that accruals reversal is one of the 
important costs associated with earnings management. It impacts the future 
earnings and thus constraints the future reporting flexibility of firms. For example, 
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an early recognition of income can potentially increase earnings in the current 
period. However this early recognition decreases the growth of future earnings, 
and limits the room of earnings management in the future. In the following part, 
we will discuss the influence of industry valuation on the costs associated with 
accrual reversal when firms engage into earnings management. 
 
Accruals Reversal 
Accrual reversal is one of the most important costs associated with earnings 
management (Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004). The decrease in future earnings as 
a result of accrual reversal is not only associated with negative stock price 
reactions (e.g. Teoh et al., 1998a and 1998b), it also constrains the flexibility of 
future earnings. However, we argue that the costs of accrual reversal is positively 
associated with industry valuation, i.e. the costs decrease in case of higher or 
increasing industry valuation and increase if industry valuation is lower or 
decreasing. Assuming that stock markets can predict future economic 
performance (Fischer and Merton, 1985, Lee, 1992), we propose the following 
relationship. When the average stock price of firms in an industry increases, 
managers of in that industry are more likely to have an optimistic outlook of the 
economic prospects and expect increasing future cash flows. As a consequence, 
they are more likely to believe that earnings management brings less constraint on 
future reporting flexibility, because the reversal of accruals will be covered, at 
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least partially, by increasing cash flows. In this case, the negative influence from 
accrual reversal will be mitigated. In the case of lower or decreasing average 
industry stock prices, the problem with reporting flexibility will be more severe if 
managers engage in earnings management. Large amount of accruals applied in 
the current period will bring much more difficulty in avoiding the negative 
consequences of an accrual reversal (i.e. a decrease of future earnings), since cash 
flow will decrease during an economic downturn or recession. Therefore, we 
conclude that the costs with reporting flexibility change with industry valuation. 
High industry valuation offers more reporting flexibility to managers. 
 
The Probability of Detecting Earnings Management 
One obvious challenge to our argument on accrual reversal might be that the 
participants of stock market can see through the components of earnings and thus 
detect accounting discretion. However, prior studies find that the probability of 
detecting earnings management by outsiders is not high (Sloan, 1996). In line 
with this, our claim is that it is lower when industry valuation is higher.  
First, it is less likely for investors to detect earnings management. Investors, 
especially individual investors, lack the ability to distinguish cash flow and 
accruals. Sloan (1996) examines the information content of both accruals and cash 
flow. He finds that investors react to earnings rather than either of its components. 
This result provides an indication that it is difficult for investors to see through 
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earnings and identify the source of earnings changes. Managers can use this to 
inflate or deflate accruals depending on the stock market valuation levels. Graham 
et al. (2005) show that CFOs believe that for investors, earnings are a more 
important metric than cash flows. Hence, we argue that the industry valuation can 
mislead investors and influence their sentiment. A high industry valuation 
predicts growing future cash flow and thus leads investors to be (more) optimistic 
about the firms’ performance. In this case, it is easier for management to engage 
in earnings management, because scrutiny of investors is lower under these 
circumstances. Conversely, a low industry valuation increases investor skepticism 
and make them more suspect of firms’ performance. 
Second, several studies find that the probability for journalists to see through 
firms’ discretion is low when an industry performs well. The financial press plays 
a key role in communicating information about corporate performance between 
firms and investors. Dyck and Zingales (2002) argue that journalists are less 
motivated to discover negative news when stock market valuation is high because 
(1) firms have more intention to release good news and are very selective to 
journalists during stock market booms; (2) in exchange for the access to 
information from firms, journalists have incentive to report more positive news. 
This result is also consistent with that of Solt and Statman (1988). They find that 
news writer’s sentiment in the current period is positively related to the stock 
market return in the prior period. Given these findings, we argue that the industry 
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valuation impacts effectiveness of media in communicating information and 
monitoring firms. It is less likely for them to alert investors about bad information, 
such as earnings management, during periods of high industry valuation. Hence, 
we propose that the probability of detecting earnings management by investors is 
lower, especially when stock market valuation is high. 
   Combining the above arguments about the influence of the industry valuation on 
the costs and the benefits of earnings management, as well as the likelihood of 
earnings management being detected, we predict that the incentives to engage in 
earnings management vary across time and are associated with aggregate levels of 
industry valuations: earnings management is expected to occur more frequently 
when industry valuation is high. Therefore, our main hypothesis is that industry 
valuation has a positive impact on the degree of earnings management in that 
industry. 
 
3. Data and Variables 
Sample Selection 
To construct our sample, we start with quarterly financial data of all 
COMPUSTAT firms appearing between 1950 and 2005. To control the effects of 
equity offers on earnings management, we also retrieve the data of IPOs and 
seasoned equity offers from SDC, which covers the period between 1970 and 
2005. After merging these two samples, our initial sample contains data covering 
- 12 - 
a period from 1970 to 2005. Next, we screen our initial sample by deleting 4858 
financial companies (SIC code starting with 6). Third, we delete the observations 
which do not have enough data to estimate discretionary accruals using the cross 
sectional modified Jones model. Fourth, we drop observations if there are less 
than 10 observations to estimate the coefficients of total accruals. Fifth, we 
exclude observations which have either missing market values and missing or 
negative book values, or missing control variables. Finally, we delete the outliers 
by excluding the bottom and top 1% of every variable. From the first to the final 
step, we obtain 164320 observations containing 9065 companies from the third 
quarter of 1985 to the fourth quarter of 2004. The steps of sample screening are 
shown in Table 1.  
-----------Please insert Table 1 here--------- 
 
Earnings Management Variables 
We use current discretionary accruals as the proxy for earnings management, 
because current discretionary accruals are ‘the component most easily subject to 
successful managerial manipulation (Teoh et al., 1998, page 195). Prior audit 
quality research also argues that firms have most of their discretion over current 
accruals (Becker et al., 1998). In addition, the main difference between 
discretionary accruals and current discretionary accruals is the accruals associated 
with depreciation. Manzon (1992) and Hunt et al. (1996) find little evidence that 
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firms manage depreciation to meet short term earnings targets. Since our analysis 
focuses on the quarterly earnings management decisions, the quarterly frequency 
will be too short to use depreciation account for earnings management. Therefore, 
we expect that when firms face pressure from aggregate stock market valuation, 
they probably first choose to manage accounts such as tax and current liabilities 
rather than depreciation. Current discretionary accruals will thus be a more proper 
measurement for the degree of earnings management in this study.  
We compute the quarterly current discretionary accruals based on the method 
of discretionary accruals in Matsumoto (2002). The total current accruals (TCAijtq) 
of firm i in two-digit SIC code j in quarter q of year t are computed as follows 
(Equation 1):  
)()( ijtqijtqijtqijtqijtq STDebtCLCashCATCA ∆−∆−∆−∆=            (1) 
 
Where ijtqCA∆   = change in current assets (Compustat item # 40) 
ijtqCash∆  = change in cash and cash equivalent (Compustat item # 36) 
            ijtqCL∆      = change in current liabilities (Compustat item # 49) 
            ijtqSTDebt∆  = change in debt included in current liabilities (Compustat 
item # 45) 
Furthermore, we use a second model to estimate current discretionary accruals 
(DCAijtq) and current nondiscretionary accruals (NDCAijtq). This model is similar 
to the modified Jones Model. However, we exclude accruals associated with the 
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growth of long term assets since we are measuring the current part of 
discretionary accruals. In addition, we add a dummy for the fourth quarter of 
every year because it is well established that the accruals in the fourth quarter are 
different (Matsumoto, 2002). 
jtjt
ijtq
ijtqijtq
jt
ijtq
jt
ijtq
ijtq Qtr
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ARREV
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TCA
εββα ++∆−∆+=
−−−
41 2
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11
         (2) 
 
Where ijtqREV∆   = change in revenue (Compustat item # 2) 
       ijtqAR∆   = change in account receivable (Compustat item # 37) 
 4Qtr   = the fourth quarter dummy 
       1−ijtqA     = lagged total assets (Compustat item # 44) 
 
We estimate Equation 2 for each firm-year using all firm quarters in that year in 
the same industry (two-digit SIC code). To get sufficient data for parameter 
estimations, those firm years with less than ten observations are excluded. After 
estimating the parameters in Equation 2, we apply them into the same model and 
then get the estimation of NDCAijtq. The difference between TCAijtq and NDCAijtq 
is the estimation of current discretionary accruals (DCAijtq) (Equation 3).  
ijtqijtqijtq NDCATCADCA −=                (3) 
 
Industry current discretionary accruals are measured as the lag asset weighted 
average of discretionary accruals of all firms in an industry. Equation 4 presents 
the way to calculate industry current discretionary accruals. 
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Where DCAjtq   = industry current discretionary accruals 
   
Stock Valuation Variable 
In their review of behavioral corporate finance, Baker et al. (2004) suggest that 
market-to-book ratio is the most often used proxy for stock valuation. Following 
the main stream studies, we also use this as our proxy for stock valuation.  
We adopt the definition of market-to-book ratio by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
and Gompers et al. (2003). According to this definition, the market value of a firm 
is calculated as the book value of assets (Compustat item #44) plus the market 
value of common stocks, less the sum of book value of common equity 
(Compustat item #59) and balance sheet deferred taxes (Compustat item #79). 
The market value of common stocks is the product of outstanding shares 
(Compustat item #61) and the stock price at the end of fiscal quarter (Compustat 
item #14). The book value of assets is defined as total assets (Compustat item 
#44). Market to book ratio is a ratio of market value of a firm to the book value of 
assets of that firm. 
The industry market-to-book ratio (MBjtq) is used as our proxy for stock market 
valuation at industry level. It is calculated as the ratio of the sum of the market 
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capitalization of all stocks in quarter q of year t in industry j to the sum of the 
book value of these stocks in the same period and same industry. 


=
i
ijtq
i
ijtq
jtq B
M
MB                 (5) 
Where Mijtq  = the market value of firm i in quarter q of year t in 
industry j  
 Bijtq  = the book value of firm i in quarter q of year t in industry j   
 MBjtq  = the industry market-to-book ratio 
 
Control Variables 
Because prior studies on earnings management have identified several factors 
that affect the degree of earnings management (e.g., Dechow et al. 1996; Bowen 
et al., 2004), it is important to control for these variables in our study as well.  
Firm valuation (VALijtq-4): several studies (e.g. Degeorge et al., 1999, 
Burgstahler and Eames, 1998) argue that firms manage their earnings to meet the 
stock market expectation and hence to sustain or increase their stock price. Jensen 
(2005) argues that overvalued equities count on their earnings to keep up the 
already high valuation. Kothari et al. (2006) find empirical evidence showing 
Jensen’s overvaluation theory is consistent with empirical findings of return 
behavior, analyst optimism and insider trading. However, Hirshleifer et al. (2004) 
find that undervalued equities also have incentive to manipulate earnings upwards 
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in order to show a performance comparable to industry peers. Therefore the 
impact of the firm’s stock market valuation on earnings management could be 
either positive or negative. We employ a market to book ratio at individual firm 
level to proxy for the stock market valuation at the firm level. 
Demand from external financing (FreeCijtq-4): An ex-ante measure of the 
demand for external financing (FreeCijtq-4) is developed by Dechow et al. (1996) 
as in Equation 6. They argue that the demand for external finance depends not 
only on how much cash is generated from operating and investment activities, but 
also on the ‘stock’ of funds already available within the firm. Since current assets 
are convertible to cash, they represent the firm’s ‘stock’ of funds. When firms 
have fewer ‘stock’ of funds, there is a higher demand for external financing, 
hence, more incentives to manage earnings. We calculate the absolute value of the 
ratio of current asset to cash from operations except average capital expenditure. 
The inverse of this ratio indicates the number of years during which firms can 
fund their operations and investments by internal funds. Following Dechow et al. 
(1996), we use this variable as an indicator variable. It is coded as 1 if the 
FreeCijtq is less than -0.5 and 0 otherwise. The expected relationship between 
earnings management and FreeCijtq-4 is positive. 
1)4(
1)4(3)4(4
4
−−
−−−−−
−
−
=
ijtq
ijtqTOijtqijtq
ijtq
etsCurrentAss
ituresitalExpendAverageCaperationsCashFromOp
FreeC    (6) 
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Leverage (LEVijtq-4): Prior studies (such as Bowen et al. 1981, Dechow et al. 
1996) use leverage to measure the debt covenant motivation for earnings 
management. Assuming that firms with more leverage are closer to debt covenant 
violation, these firms are more inclined to engage in earnings management. We 
use leverage to measure the closeness of firms to their potential debt covenant 
violation. Leverage is defined as total long term debt (Compustat item #51) scaled 
by total total assets (Compustat item #44).    
Size (SIZEijtq-4): Several studies find that larger firms have more potential for 
earnings management. Bartov (1993) argues that larger firms have more room for 
earnings manipulation through asset sales. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argue 
that larger firms face higher political costs and hence have stronger incentives to 
manage earnings in order to reduce the potential political risk. Francis et al. (1996) 
have similar results for asset write-offs. So, the expected sign of the influence 
from size on earnings management is not clear from the literature. We use the 
natural logarithm of sales (Compustat Item #2) as the proxy of firm size. The sign 
of the relationship between discretionary accruals and firms size is not predicted. 
Performance (ROAijtq-4): Dechow et al. (1995, p. 193) show that accruals are 
correlated with not only the current performance but also with the past 
performance. However the (modified) Jones model only control for the current 
performance. Kothari et al. (2005) show that the models to estimate discretionary 
accruals are often mis-specified if the firms’ performance is not controlled for. 
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Bowen et al. (2004) include ROA as a control variable when analyzing the 
relationship between earnings management and corporate governance variables. 
We use return on assets (ROAijtq) to proxy for firms’ performance and use ROAijtq 
as a control variable, where ROAijtq is defined as income before extraordinary 
items (Compustat Item #8) scaled by lagged total assets (Compustat Item #44). 
Equity Issue (IPOijtq+m, SEOijtq+m): Several studies (e.g., Friedlan, 1994, Teoh et 
al. 1998) find that firms manage earnings upward before going public to attract 
investors. Similar income increasing earnings management is also found before 
seasoned equity offerings (Teoh et al. 1998b, Shivakumar, 2000). Lamont and 
Stein (2006) find that the scale and numbers of financial activities of firms are 
positively associated with the aggregate stock market valuation. Therefore, our 
study faces the challenge that results might partially driven by equity offerings. 
To control for this alternative explanation, dummies for both IPOs (IPOijtq+m) and 
seasoned equity offers (SEOijtq+m) will be introduced into the analysis. IPOijtq+m 
and SEOijtq+m stand for the IPO dummies and SEO dummies of company i in the 
quarter q+m of year t in the industry j, where m varies from -4 to 4. These 
dummies are equal to one if in the four quarters before (m=[-4,0]) and after the 
quarter (m=(0, 4]) either IPOs or seasoned equity offers are implemented. 
Industry and Quarter dummies(Din, Dqtr): to control for other unobservable 
factors that might influence firms’ earnings management decisions we introduce 
industry (two-digit SIC code) and quarter dummies. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the final sample appear in Table 2. To avoid that our 
results are influenced by outliers, we trim each variable at the first and 99th 
percentile. The mean of current discretionary accruals is 0.58%, and its median is 
0.46%. The individual market-to-book ratio has a mean of 1.9875 and a median of 
1.4189. The mean of the industry market to book ratio is 1.8712, and the median 
is 1.637. Comparing the mean of other control variables with those reported in 
Bowen et al. (2004), it appears that our sample has firms with a larger degree of 
earnings management, higher leverage and smaller size. This result is not 
surprising since they only include firms in the S&P 500, S&P 400 mid cap and 
S&P 600 small cap. The correlation matrix is reported in Table 3. Consistent with 
prior studies, total discretionary accruals have a positive relationship with free 
cash flows, firm size, and firm performance.  
-----------Please insert Table 2 and Table 3 here--------- 
 
 4. Empirical Tests and Results 
In this section, we present the results of our empirical tests. To distinguish the 
effect of industry valuation from that of the factors documented by prior studies, 
we develop a two stage analysis. In the first stage, we explain earnings 
management by regressing it on the control variables including leverage, size, 
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performance, demand for external funds, equity issue dummies, time dummies 
and industry dummies. Control variables excluding dummy variables (equity issue 
dummies, time dummies and industry dummies) have a one-year lag behind the 
period of earnings management. As a result of this, the error terms from the first 
step regression contain the component of earnings management not explained by 
the variables in the first stage regression. We then aggregate the error terms for 
each industry quarter. The aggregation is a proxy for the unexplained part of 
earnings management at industry level and thus the dependent variable in our 
second stage regression. In the second stage, we use a univariate regression to 
examine the association between unexplained earnings management in industry 
quarters and the four-quarter lagged industry market to book ratio. The coefficient 
estimated from this regression provides us with an estimate of the effect of 
industry valuation on the degree of earnings management in that industry. In 
comparison with a single stage analysis approach, the advantage of a two stage 
analysis is to avoid collinearity problems between the industry market to book 
ratio and the quarter dummies.   
    Equation 7 (see below) is the model we used in the first step of the regression 
with current discretionary accruals as the dependent variable. Panel A of Table 4 
shows the results of this model. The coefficients of firm valuation, demand of 
external finance, and performance are consistent with prior studies. The signs of 
these coefficients are positive, while all are significant at 0.0001 level. Also the 
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coefficient of firm size is positive and significant at 0.1 level. This result is 
consistent with the idea that larger firms have more resources to manage earnings. 
We do not report the coefficients of quarter and industry dummies for reasons of 
brevity. The overall R square of Model 7 is 1.40%, suggesting that much of the 
variation in discretionary accruals remains unexplained. However, we should bear 
in mind that this low R square is not surprising because our sample is not 
constructed conditional on special events, like for example in the case of equity 
offerings. Moreover, prior studies on earnings management, such as Kasznik 
(1999) and Xie et al. (2002), report similar levels of explanatory power in their 
models. 
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Where    DCAijtq = Current discretionary accruals estimated by modified 
Jones model 
   VALijtq-4 = Market to book ratio of individual firms 
   LEVijtq-4 = Leverage, the ratio of long term debt to total assets 
   FreeCijtq-4 = Demand for external fund 
   SIZEijtq-4 = Firm size measured as ln(sales) 
   ROAijtq-4 = Firm performance 
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   IPOijtq+m = IPO dummies 
   SEOijtq+m = Seasoned equity offer dummies 
Dqtr  = Quarter Dummies 
   Din     = Industry dummies 
 
After the first stage analysis we aggregate the error term of each industry by 
quarter and regress the aggregated error terms on the industry market to book 
ratio (see equation 8).  
jtqjtq
i
ijtq MB νλλε ++= − 410               (8) 
where 
i
ijtqε            = Aggregated error terms from the first stage analysis per 
industry 
4−jtqMB  = Lagged aggregate industry market to book ratio 
 
---------Please insert Table 4 and 5 here--------- 
 
 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the second stage are presented in 
Table 5. Panel B of Table 4 presents the result of the second stage analysis. The 
coefficient of the industry valuation from the second step is significantly positive, 
which is consistent with our hypothesis. This result shows that the industry 
average valuation has a positive relationship with the earnings management, after 
controlling for the usual suspects. The coefficient of the industry valuation is 
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0.0014, which is significant at 0.0001 level. This result implies that one standard 
deviation increase in industry valuation leads to an increase of 0.08 percentage 
point in aggregated error terms, which is about 11% of its average value. To 
translate this result into earnings per share, we first calculate the quarterly 
industry wide assets per share, which is a ratio of the sum of total assets to the 
sum outstanding shares in each quarter. The mean of the industry asset per share 
in our sample is 30.06 dollars per share. One standard deviation increase in 
industry market to book ratio will lead to an increase of about 2.4 cents (0.08% * 
30.06= 2.4) in quarterly aggregate earnings per share. In sum, our result suggests 
that industry valuation influences the degree of earnings management, especially 
the current component of earnings management. 
 
Discretionary accruals 
Most earnings management studies use total discretionary accruals to proxy for 
earnings management. Although total discretionary accruals are not the best proxy 
in the context of our analysis, we also examine the relationship between the 
industry valuation and discretionary accruals. Equation 9 shows the first stage of 
the analysis with discretionary accruals as the dependent variable. In this stage, 
we still regress the firm level discretionary accruals on the control variables, 
which have been examined by prior studies.  The error terms from this analysis 
are assumed to represent the part not explained by the control variables. After the 
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first stage analysis, we aggregate the error terms of firms in same industry of each 
quarter and regress the aggregated error terms on industry valuation in the second 
stage (Equation 10).  
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Where    DAijtq = Discretionary accruals estimated by modified Jones model 
jtqjtq
i
ijtq MB νλλε ++= − 410             (10) 
 
Table 6 presents the result of the analysis based on Equation 9. In the Panel A 
of Table 6, except for the coefficient of firm valuation (VALijtq-4), the coefficients 
of other independent variables are similar with those in prior studies. The signs of 
these coefficients are in line with expectations. Panel B of Table 6 shows the 
result of equation 10. Table 7 presents the statistics of the variables in the second 
stage analysis. The positive coefficient of industry average market to book ratio 
indicates a positive relationship between industry valuation and the earnings 
management, beyond the control variables. The coefficient of the industry 
valuation is 0.0027 and significant at 0.0001 level. One standard deviation 
increase in the industry valuation leads to an increase of 0.14 percentage points in 
aggregated error terms, which is about 16% of its average value. 
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---------Please insert Table 6 and 7 here--------- 
 
 
Robustness checks 
To exclude alternative explanations for the previous results, we conduct several 
sensitivity analyses. First, it is possible that our results are driven by high tech 
firms because high tech firms use more stock based compensations that other 
firms. A higher level stock based compensation can create more incentives for 
firms to manage earnings. To control for these effects, we follow the definition of 
high tech firms by Loughran and Ritter (2004) and exclude these high tech firms 
from our sample. We find that the relationship between industry valuation and 
earnings management is still significantly positive. This result shows that the 
positive association between industry valuation and earnings management is not 
driven by the high tech sector. 
Second, during the booming of the stock market in the late 1990s, the 
likelihood to detect earnings management may be higher than other periods. 
Accounting fraud cases may have increased investors scrutiny. Therefore, our 
results may be driven by the stock market bubble, such as in the years 1999 and 
2000. To mitigate this effect, we exclude observations in 1999 and 2000 from our 
sample and re-run the analyses. The results remain significant positive, indicating 
an association between industry valuation and earnings management. Hence, our 
results are not driven by bubble years. 
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Third, we test our hypothesis using four quarter lagged industry valuation 
because we assume that managers take the action of managing earnings by 
evaluating industry valuation level of the same quarter in the past year. To 
examine the sensitivity of this to our results, we also test the relationship between 
earnings management and industry valuation of three quarter, two quarter and one 
quarter ago. The results show that earnings management also has a positive 
relationship with the industry valuation with three quarter lag, two quarter lag, 
and one quarter lag. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
    This study investigates the relationship between industry valuation and 
earnings management behavior. Previous academic research has investigated 
several capital market motivations of earnings management. However, most of 
these studies take the industry environment as constant and focus on earnings 
management around firm specific and transaction specific transactions. We argue 
that the industry valuation will affect the expected payoff and the cost of earnings 
management, and thus has an impact on earnings management. Our main 
hypothesis is that industry valuation has a positive impact on the degree of 
earnings management in an industry. 
    We apply a two stage empirical model to explore the association between 
industry aggregate earnings management and industry valuation. We use current 
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discretionary accruals as our proxy for earnings management because it is “the 
component most easily subject to successful managerial manipulation (Teoh et al., 
1998, page 195)”. Besides using current discretionary accruals as the proxy of 
earnings management, we also follow other earnings management studies and use 
discretionary accruals as another proxy for earnings management. After 
controlling for the effects of other factors on earnings management, such as 
leverage, firm size and firm performance, we find a significant positive 
relationship both between industry valuation and aggregate discretionary current 
accruals, and between industry valuation and aggregate discretionary accruals. 
Therefore, we conclude that industry valuation is another motivation of earnings 
management. 
In sum, the empirical findings reported in this study show that earnings 
management decisions are not only subjective to firm-specific or transaction-
specific factors, but also influenced by levels of industry valuation. Our claim is 
that industry valuation provides an accurate measure to examine the impact of 
market conditions, i.e. the valuation levels of stocks on earnings management, 
since economic cycles vary in time across industry. Industry valuation therefore 
constitutes an important factor that enables us to explain earnings management 
motives. In addition, different from existing studies (Jensen, 2005) on overvalued 
firms and earnings management, we show that the level of industry valuation can 
impact the earnings management decisions of all firms in that industry. 
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Table 1 
Sample criteria 
Table 1 presents the steps to screen our initial sample. Firstly, we screen this 
initial sample by non-US stocks and financial companies (SIC code starting with 
6). Secondly, we delete the observations which do not have enough data to 
estimate discretionary accruals by cross sectional Modified Jones model. Thirdly, 
we drop observations if there are less than 10 observations to estimate the 
coefficients of total accruals. Fourthly, we exclude observations which have the 
missing market value and book value, and other missing control variables. Finally, 
we delete the outliers by excluding the bottom and top 1% of every variable.  
 
Screening Steps No. of Obs. in Sample No. of Firms Sample Period 
Initial sample 1871232 22382 1970.1~2005.4 
    
Less: financial firms 1475632 17524 1970.1~2005.4 
    
Less: observations with less than  
necessary data for Modified Jones 
model 
498315 15601 1972.3~2005.4 
    
Less: less then 10 observations for 
Modified Jones model estimation 
382012 15267 1975.1~2005.4 
    
Less: Missing control variables 178683 9354 1985.3~2004.4 
     
Less: top and bottom 1% outliers 164320 9065 1985.3~2004.4 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample with current 
discretionary accruals as the dependent variable. DCAijtq is quarterly current 
discretionary accruals estimated from modified Jones model. MBijtq-4 is industry 
market to book ratio with a four quarter lag behind the quarter of DCAijtq. VALijtq-4, 
LEVijtq-4, FreeCijtq-4, SIZEijtq-4, ROAijtq-4, represent market to book ratio of 
individual firms, leverage, demand of external capital, firm size, firm performance 
and firm  risk respectively. They all have a four quarter lag behind the quarter 
when DCA is estimated. VALijtq-4  is defined as the book value of assets 
(Compustat item #44) plus the market value of common stocks, less the sum of 
book value of common equity (Compustat item #59) and balance sheet deferred 
taxes (Compustat item #79). The market value of common stocks is the product of 
outstanding shares (Compustat item #61) and the stock price at the end of fiscal 
quarter (Compustat item #14). The book value of assets is defined as total assets 
(Compustat item #44). Market to book ratio is a ratio of market value of a firm to 
the book value of assets of that firm. LEVijtq-4 is a ratio of total long term debt 
(Compustat item #51) to total total assets (Compustat item #44).  FreeCijtq-4  is the 
absolute value of the ratio of current asset to cash from operations except average 
capital expenditure. SIZEijtq-4 is defined as the natural logarithm of sales 
(Compustat Item #2) as the proxy of firm size. ROAijtq-4 is the income before 
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extraordinary items (Compustat Item #8) scaled by lagged total assets (Compustat 
Item #44). 
Variable Firm-quarters Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
DCA
 ijtq 164320 0.0058 0.0046 0.0879 -0.5254 0.6222 
MBijtq-4 164320 1.8712 1.637 0.7479 0.752 6.0992 
VALijtq-4 164320 1.9875 1.4189 1.6869 0.5518 15.3904 
LEVijtq-4 164320 0.1745 0.1228 0.1856 0 0.9055 
FreeCijtq-4 164320 0.0753 0 0.2707 0 1 
SIZEijtq-4 164320 3.1286 3.1361 2.1979 -3.2968 8.3825 
ROAijtq-4 164320 -0.0088 0.0078 0.0638 -0.4764 0.1065 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Correlation matrix 
 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of variables of the final sample.  
 
  DCA
 ijtq MBijtq-4 VALijtq-4 LEVijtq-4 FreeCijtq-4 SIZEijtq-4 ROAijtq-4 
DCA
 ijtq 1       
MBijtq-4 -0.0101 1      
VALijtq-4 0.0124 0.2661 1     
LEVijtq-4 -0.0083 -0.1624 -0.2085 1    
FreeCijtq-4 0.0059 -0.0515 0.0247 0.1653 1   
SIZEijtq-4 0.0173 -0.0917 -0.2131 0.2433 -0.1285 1  
ROAijtq-4 0.0478 -0.1397 -0.2191 0.0305 -0.2267 0.4042 1 
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Table 4 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the results of regression based on Equation 7, 
where the dependent variable is current discretionary accruals (DCAijtq) of firm i 
in industry j at the quarter q of year t. VALijtq-4, LEVijtq-4, FreeCijtq-4, SIZEijtq-4, 
ROAijtq-4, RISKijtq-4 represent market to book ratio of individual firms, leverage, 
demand of external capital, firm size, firm performance respectively. They all 
have a four quarter lag behind the quarter in which DCAijtq is estimated. IPOijtq+m 
and SEOijtq+m are dummies variables for IPOs and Seasoned Equity offers from 
the four quarters before when DCA is estimated to the four quarters after that. The 
coefficients for quarter and industry dummies are also included in the regression 
but not reported here. Panel B of Table 4 presents of the results of the second 
stage regression based on Equation 8, where the dependent variable 
i
jtqε  is the 
quarterly aggregated error terms of each industry from the first step. The 
independent variable is the industry market to book ratio, which is the 
measurement of industry valuation.   
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Panel A: Results of First Stage Analysis  
ijtqit
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Variable Coefficient P-Value Variable Coefficient P-Value 
VALijtq-4 0.0010 0.000 IPO ijtq+3 0.0039 -0.039 
LEVijtq-4 -0.0052 0.000 IPO ijtq+4 0.0264 -0.018 
FreeCijtq-4 0.0061 0.000 SEO ijtq-4 0.0039 0.000 
SIZEijtq-4 0.0002 0.092 SEO ijtq-3 0.0043 0.001 
ROAijtq-4 0.0725 0.000 SEO ijtq-2 0.0085 0.005 
IPO ijtq-4 0.0002 0.979 SEO ijtq-1 0.0118 0.008 
IPO ijtq-3 -0.0075 -0.042 SEO ijtq 0.0126 0.009 
IPO ijtq-2 0.0199 -0.015 SEO ijtq-+1 0.0091 0.005 
IPO ijtq-1 0.0035 -0.032 SEO ijtq+2 0.0042 0.000 
IPO ijtq -0.0017 -0.043 SEO ijtq+3 0.0015 -0.003 
IPO ijtq+1 -0.0242 -0.065 SEO ijtq+4 0.0052 0.001 
IPO
 ijtq+2 0.0178 -0.023 Intercept 0.0433 0.390 
Overall R-sqrt 0.014           
No. of Observations 164320           
Panel B: Result of Second Stage Analysis  
jtqjtq
i
ijtq MB νλλε ++= − 410  
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient p-value 
MBjtq-4 + 0.0014 0.000 
Intercept   0.0053 0.000 
Adjusted R-sqrt 0.007           
No of observations 4549           
 
 
Table 5 
The Statistics of Variables in the Second Stage Analysis  
 
Variable Industry Quarters Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 
MBjtq-4 
4549 1.5957 0.5361 0.7520 6.0992 
 4549 0.0075 0.0086 -0.0335 0.0608 
 
 −
i
jtq 4ε
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Table 6 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results of regression based on Equation 9, 
where the dependent variable is discretionary accruals (DAijtq) of firm i in industry 
j at the quarter q of year t. VALijtq-4, LEVijtq-4, FreeCijtq-4, SIZEijtq-4, ROAijtq-4, 
represent market to book ratio of individual firms, leverage, demand of external 
capital, firm size, firm performance respectively. They all have a four quarter lag 
behind the quarter in which DAijtq is estimated. IPOijtq+m and SEOijtq+m are 
dummies variables for IPOs and Seasoned Equity offers from the four quarters 
before when DA is estimated to the four quarters after that. The coefficients for 
quarter and industry dummies are also included in the regression but not reported 
here. Panel B of Table 6 presents of the results of the second stage regression 
based on Equation 10, where the dependent variable 
i
jtqε  is the quarterly 
aggregated error terms of each industry from the first step. The independent 
variable is the industry market to book ratio, which is the measurement of 
industry valuation.   
- 40 - 
Panel A: Results of First Stage Analysis  
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Variable Coefficient P-Value Variable Coefficient P-Value 
VALijtq-4 -0.0005 0.044 IPO ijtq+3 -0.0051 0.864 
LEVijtq-4 0.0077 0.001 IPO ijtq+4 0.0191 0.527 
FreeCijtq-4 0.0078 0.000 SEO ijtq-4 -0.0038 0.237 
SIZEijtq-4 -0.0006 0.000 SEO ijtq-3 0.0010 0.763 
ROAijtq-4 0.1136 0.000 SEO ijtq-2 0.0055 0.085 
IPO ijtq-4 0.0000 0.999 SEO ijtq-1 0.0063 0.060 
IPO ijtq-3 0.0010 0.976 SEO ijtq 0.0111 0.001 
IPO ijtq-2 0.0303 0.343 SEO ijtq-+1 0.0067 0.052 
IPO ijtq-1 -0.0087 0.780 SEO ijtq+2 0.0008 0.822 
IPO ijtq -0.0307 0.401 SEO ijtq+3 0.0038 0.279 
IPO ijtq+1 -0.0335 0.360 SEO ijtq+4 0.0087 0.015 
IPO
 ijtq+2 0.0142 0.658 Intercept 0.0677 0.468 
Overall R-sqrt 0.029         
No. of Observations 127257         
Panel B: Result of Second Stage Analysis of the DA Sample 
jtqjtq
i
ijtq MB νλλε ++= − 410  
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient p-value 
MBjtq-4 + 0.0027 0.000 
Intercept   0.0043 0.000 
Adjusted R-sqrt 0.004     
No of observations 4391     
 
 
Table 7 
The Statistics of Variables in the Second Stage Analysis 
Variable Industry quarters Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 
MBjtq-4 
4391 1.5909 0.5325 0.752 6.0992 
 4391 0.0086 0.0237 -0.0501 0.0847 
 
 −
i
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